{
  "generatedAt": "2026-11-13T07:53:35.117Z",
  "how": "Each attack runs the real Horos commands in a fresh directory against fake Airwallex, Airi and T:0; counts come from the fakes. Regenerate with `npm run demo`.",
  "control": {
    "said": "PAID",
    "confirms": 1,
    "charges": 1,
    "credentials": 1
  },
  "attacks": [
    {
      "id": "bank-change-email",
      "title": "Supplier email moves the money",
      "attack": "After the payment is approved, an email claiming to be Slack asks for this and all future payments to go to a new IBAN.",
      "result": {
        "said": "BILL_HOLD_FOR_REVIEW",
        "confirms": 0,
        "charges": 0,
        "credentials": 0
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "model-talked-down",
      "title": "The model is persuaded the email is routine",
      "attack": "The same email, but Claude's answer says ROUTINE and quotes a harmless line. The IBAN is still in the text.",
      "result": {
        "said": "BILL_HOLD_FOR_REVIEW",
        "confirms": 0,
        "charges": 0,
        "credentials": 0
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "paid-elsewhere",
      "title": "Someone else already paid it",
      "attack": "While the passkey prompt is open, the bill is marked paid in T:0 by another system. Horos is not told.",
      "result": {
        "said": "ELIGIBILITY_CHANGED:BILL_WITHDRAWN",
        "confirms": 0,
        "charges": 0,
        "credentials": 1
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "duplicate-paid",
      "title": "The duplicate copy gets paid first",
      "attack": "A second accounting record of the same invoice appears, then is paid elsewhere, so it leaves the open list.",
      "result": {
        "said": "BILL_HOLD_FOR_REVIEW",
        "confirms": 0,
        "charges": 0,
        "credentials": 0
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "expiry-mid-flight",
      "title": "Authority expires mid-payment",
      "attack": "The last read of T:0 before confirming takes 20 minutes; the 15-minute mandate expires while Horos waits.",
      "result": {
        "said": "intent cancelled: not confirmed: MANDATE_EXPIRED",
        "confirms": 0,
        "charges": 0,
        "credentials": 1
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "reopen-after-lost-ack",
      "title": "An operator retries a payment that went through",
      "attack": "The charge succeeds but its acknowledgement is lost. An operator tries to reopen the bill and pay it again with a second mandate.",
      "result": {
        "said": "not reopened: the provider does not prove this attempt unpaid; resolve PAID if it paid, or run reconcile when the provider is readable; second mandate: OBLIGATION_PAYMENT_UNKNOWN",
        "confirms": 1,
        "charges": 1,
        "credentials": 1,
        "note": "the one charge is the original payment, which recovery then books as PAID"
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "other-checkout-path",
      "title": "A mandate for a lookalike checkout",
      "attack": "The passkey-approved mandate points at the verified host, but another path on it.",
      "result": {
        "said": "MERCHANT_URL_NOT_VERIFIED_DESTINATION",
        "confirms": 0,
        "charges": 0,
        "credentials": 0
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "reused-approval",
      "title": "An old approval after the destination changed",
      "attack": "A person re-verifies the bill to a different checkout. The earlier approval is then used to pay.",
      "result": {
        "said": "APPROVAL_STALE:verificationId,destination",
        "confirms": 0,
        "charges": 0,
        "credentials": 0
      }
    }
  ]
}